% tu zdefiniowana COGNITIVE RHETORIC
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{\q CHAPTER ONE}
\vskip.5cm \noindent
{\tit On \hskip2pt the \hskip2pt Rhetorical \hskip2pt Point \hskip2pt of
\hskip2pt View}
\vskip.2mm
\SECTION{Why rhetoric declined, and what remained of it}
{}\hskip-5pt
{\bf 1.1.} Once upon a time rhetoric was a vast and influential branch of
learning, closely tied to Grammar and to Logic within the famous mediaeval
\id{Trivium}. Nowadays it does not appear in research programmes nor 
in curricula, and historical studies alone mention it as a venerable
monument of the past. On the other hand, the career of its sister
disciplines Grammar and Logic has been a real success story.

\sb{Grammar} evolved into an immense field of linguistic studies, both
theoretically pregnant and fruitful in applications, related to logic and
mathematics, to empirical areas such as psychology and sociology, as well
as to neurophysiology and computer science. \sb{Logic} has proved a still
greater success. After having been built on algebraic principles (which
Aristotle himself did not dream of), it essentially contributed to
building modern unified mathematics, opened up new prospects to
philosophy, and paved the way to the idea of computers.

Why did rhetoric fail to match the advances of its relatives? There is no
simple answer to such a question. However, in order to define my
`rhetorical point of view' as held in this essay, I should attempt to 
suggest a sketchy answer. A more detailed account would require 
thorough research, for \sb{rhetoric} was deeply involved in the course
of cultural and political history. It is why to substantiate any
hypothesis regarding this issue would mean engaging in a comprehensive
historical study.%
\note{\n
Worthy of mention  here is the monumental eight-volume study by the
Polish historian of mediaeval philosophy (and my university professor and
master) Stefan Swie\.zawski {\bin Dzieje Filozofii Europejskiej XV Wieku}
[The History of European Philosophy in the 15th Century]; the first five
volumes were published by The Catholic Theological Academy in Warsaw,
1974-1980.  In spite of being written in Polish, the work may prove useful
to a non-Polish reader due to abundant references as well as quotations
in main European languages. There are partial translations of this work
into French and English; a synthetic version appeared in one
volume in French, see Swie\.zawski [1990]. Other versions, corresponding to
particular volumes of the Polish edition, are to appear.  This work is
especially useful for studying the history of rhetoric since the 15th
century, as combining the mediaeval heritage with revived ideas of
Antiquity provides us with a wonderful image of rhetoric's former power and
glory.} 
%----------------------------
\msn
{\bf 1.2.} Rhetoric more than Logic or Grammar was involved in political,
social and cultural circumstances of past periods which no longer exist in
our times. For example, a politician's image is nowadays more shaped by
his TV appearance than by his ability to form long decorative phrases in
his speeches. There was a time when rhetoric served that special form of
democracy  which was characteristic of city-states or free cities in
Antiquity, and in mediaeval and Renaissance Europe. However, modern
democracy requires other means of influence.

One should also take into account the increasing differentiation of
political and cultural life. In view of that process, as opposed to the
situation in former periods, no universal methods of persuasion can
nowadays be recommended to speakers and writers. Such methods, as codified
by Aristotle, Quintilian, 
Cicero et al., were unanimously believed throughout centuries and millennia
to be unquestionably valid. Now we are perfectly aware that one must argue
in quite a different manner, e.g., when addressing an EEC committee, and
when negotiating with Muslim fundamentalists.

This new awareness must have dawned in the 17th century when travellers
and missionaries discovered cultures and mentalities so much differring
from ours; certainly, Cicero's rules of persuasion proved of no
particular use when faced with a Chinese or a Guarani audience.  Both
of these audiences exemplify the Jesuits' successful art of arguing, far
from orthodox rhetorical prescriptions. In China, Jesuit missionaries
had considerable success in convincing rulers and mandarins of the high
scientific and technical performances of Western civilization, thus
arousing respect for Christian ideas. In Paraguay, Jesuits managed to
transform Guarani Indians into docile and devoted Christian converts who
obeyed orders to farm the land, build churches, and perform some
administrative tasks for their community. Certainly, the Fathers did not
consult either Aristotle or Cicero.

In spite of the flourishing state of rhetoric in the 17th and the next
century, the widening of the world beyond the boundaries of the
Graeco-Roman culture must have intiated the process of decline. Furthermore,
in the 19th century the rise of new branches of learning, as ethnography,
sociology and psychology, contributed to the art of dealing with people
by taking into account their social and individual peculiarities.
But even if people no longer expect authorative answers from the old
rhetoric, there does remain the rhetorical problem of {\it how to
convince someone of my ideas}. Thus there remains a
\sb{rhetorical point of view}.

What nowadays can be seen from that point is far from the
ancient or mediaeval rethorical landscape. Nevertheless, it is that old
rhetoric to which we owe our present ability to see and to state problems
--- e.g., that of relations between logic and rhetoric; in this example one
may see how new answers are due to our inheriting some old questions.
And where problems arise, we can investigate them in a manner that would
suit our present ends and interests.
%-----------------------------------
\msn
{\bf 1.3.} The same 17th century witnessed another trend which undermined
the logical side of rhetoric, namely a new situation in logic which
accompanied the decline of the old paradigm for science. A look at this
process should make the point of this chapter clear.

Aristotelian logic reached its climax between the 12th and the 15th
century. Then it marched in the vanguard of mediaeval rationalism which
looked for its place within the limits --- not too vast, indeed --- of
theological orthodoxy. The Christian faith was declared to accord with
natural reason, and the latter was exercised mainly by developing and
applying logic. When theology was dominant among the branches of
learning, intellectual achievements in that field mattered more than
in any other one. A success in theology could have been measured only by
two criteria: that of accordance with orthodox teachings and that of
accordance with logic. There was no way of falsifying a theological
conjecture through empirical reality, but it might have been refuted either as
disagreeing with a theological axiom or as disobeying a logical rule; the
latter would have referred to the mode of its being derived from formerly
accepted propositions.

However, due to the speeding up of the progress of science since the 16th century,
people started to realize that the reputedly intelligent thinkers might have
been fairly ignorant of the subtleties of Aristotelian logic. That
observation was backed up through the critical examination of logic
itself. It was hard to find in its procedures anything that could have
aided Galileo's or Copernicus' discoveries, Gutenberg's involved
technology (owed to a unique combination of craftsmen' skills), or
Columbus' ideas. This is  
why the existing logic was so vehemently accused of uselessness and
sterility both by Francis Bacon, who spoke on behalf of natural science,
and by Ren\'e Descartes, inspired by his own success in mathematics.

Thus logic itself, being an important ally of rhetoric, started to suffer
losses in the postmediaeval period. Temporarily it could even have improved
the chances of rhetoric as an art of live speech and writing opposed to
pedantic logic unable to move human souls. Yet, when tracing the history
of rhetoric, especially its theory with Aristotle and Cicero as the
greatest authorities, one must agree that its roots went back to logic.
A figurative style as developed in the extra-logical branch of rhetoric
was appreciated as a means to more powerfully influence an audience, but the main
force of arguments was looked for in the rules of logic. Thus the decrease
of the authority of logic must in the long run have diminished the
position of rhetoric, too.

That historical experience gives rise to the question concerning the chances of
rhetoric after the revival and dramatic development of logic in our times.
Is a new flourishing of rhetoric possible? We should not expect the
answer in the affirmative as history is like a stream,
and one can never enter the same stream twice. However, the rise of new theories
and practical skills which deal with problems of efficient communication
does leave much room for a new form of rhetoric. Firstly, there is the task
of applying some achievements of modern logic to the art of successful
communication, especially in regard to argumentation.

That limited but important task should be attributed to what I suggest we
call \sb{cognitive rhetoric}, as a discipline which is (i) supported by a
theory of \sb{natural logic} taking advantage of symbolic logic (see
Chapter Six,
Section 3), and (ii) being developed for theorizing about arguments to be
addressed to intelligent and benevolent audiences. This essay is meant
as a reconnaissance of that nascent field of inquiry. The inquiry should
take over the tasks of the old retired rhetoric, to carry it on in a new
way, adjusted to the new times.

The term `cognitive rhetoric' is to play a significant role in the further
discussion; the adjective contributes to explaining why rhetoric should
take advantage of logic when logic is seen as fundamental for the study of
cognition. However, this is not to mean that a new academic discipline is
being planned. The distance between a fully formed discipline and other
theoretical activities, even if these are distinguished by special names,
can be measured with the help of a set of lucid distinctions devised by
Posner [1988].  According to that essay, an academic discipline must
include the following five components: (1) the {\it domain} as a set of
objects, (2) the {\it subject matter} as a set of relevant properties (of
these objects) referred to by suitable predicates, (3) the {\it methods}
as a set of rules, (4) the {\it body of knowledge} as a set of asserted
propositions, (5) the {\it presentation} as a set of means of expression
(natural language, technical terminology, symbolism, diagrams, etc.).
Cognitive rhetoric shares the domain with semiotics but differs from
semiotics in item 2 as it involves predicates to express instructions and
evaluations --- in accordance with the old tradition of rhetoric as
concerned with the art of an efficient activity (therefore, in Posner's
terminology, its results have the status of a doctrine but not that of a
theory). In the methodological aspect, it is characteristic for cognitive
rhetoric, e.g., that it treats formal logic as a ladder to be mounted and
then dispensed with (to use Wittgenstein's parable) in order to try a next
approximation in rendering the nature of arguments. Therefore it possesses
its own body of knowledge, e.g. the propositions comparing formal and
material arguments.  Thus, there are sufficient reasons to treat cognitive
rhetoric as a special field of study, though not in so extensive and so
advanced a way that it could be regarded as an academic discipline.
%====================================================================
\SECTION{Descartes, Leibniz and Pascal facing a crisis in logic}
{}\hskip-5pt
{\bf 2.1.} Thus, in the 17th century began a
\id{crisis in logic} which also undermined rhetoric. What can we learn
from that story when attempting to build rhetoric again on a logical
basis?

According to the view so outspokenly stated by Thomas Kuhn, any crisis
in science, as in politics, has to bring about a significant turn, or
even a \sb{scientific revolution}. This view sounds convincing to 
anyone familiar with what happened in science in the 17th century.
Kuhn's [1962] views happen to be criticized for some claims belonging
more to philosophy of science than to its history. Whether scientific
revolutions must appear with cyclic regularity, is an issue as debatable
as the analogous question in political philosophy. But that revolutions do
happen is no risky contention, and that a most dramatic revolution within
science did occur in the 17th century is common knowledge.%
\note{\n
E.g., in the entry `modern' in {\bin Webster's Third New International
Dictionary} a typical use of the term in question is exemplified with
Josiah Royce's saying ``modern thought is a very recent affair, dating
back only to the seventeenth century''.}

People concerned with logic were not isolated in their feeling that the
old foundations proved to be wrong and that new foundations needed to be
constructed. The feeling of crisis was overwhelming. It had a dramatic 
effect upon the Church and resulted in the emergence of Protestantism. It
was also apparent in philosophy, and in views on human knowledge as
well as views on physical reality. Revolutionary movement in that area
resulted in the new paradigm which was self-consciously and, so to speak,
enthusiastically mechanistic.

Before we attempt to ponder the impact of that new framework upon logic
and rhetoric, let us explain the stress being laid upon events of the 17th
century, though the process in question must have started earlier.
A brilliant justification of such a historical
approach is given by Butterfield [1958] in chapter ten entitled ``The
place of the scientific revolution in the history of western
civilization'' (p.~180).
\s
{\ls Though everything comes by antecedents and mediations---and these may
always  be traced farther and farther back without the mind ever coming to
rest---still, we can speak of certain epochs of crucial transition, when
the subterranean movements come above ground, and new things are palpably
born, and the very  face of the earth can be seen to be changing. On this
view we may say that in regard not merely to the history of science but
to civilization and society as a whole the transformation becomes obvious,
and the changes become congested, in the latter part of the seventeenth
century. We may take the line that here, for practical purposes, our
modern civilization is coming out in a perceptible manner into the
daylight. \ssn}
{}\hskip-4.5pt
To a great extent our modern civilization is due to the mechanistic paradigm
of science.%
\note{\n How this paradigm has brought about the dramatic progress in
natural science can be learnt from the quoted book by Butterfield, also
from the very instructive {\bin The Evolution of Physics} [1947] by Albert
Einstein and  Leopold Infeld.} The crisis which endangered science at
the end of Middle Ages was overcome with the emergence and successful
development of that paradigm.  However, logic did not participate in that
process. Its rules proved useless in making discoveries, and its content
did not fit into the \sb{mechanistic framework}. The latter point, though 
not the fault of logic itself, might have left it beyond the main current of
thought.  Thus two combined issues challenged philosophers: (i) how to
make logic assist the creative thinking that would lead to discoveries,
and (ii) how to build it into the general mechanistic outlook.

Three solutions have been suggested for this set of problems, each retaining
its validity up to our times, and each being pertinent to a rhetorical
approach to logic. Let they be named after the most eminent philosophers
in 
the 17th century, namely Descartes, Leibniz and Pascal.  Descartes
and Leibniz initiated new approaches to logic, competing with one another.
Pascal was more concerned with an analysis of the mind than with creating a
logical system, nevertheless he gave logic two strong impulses, one
towards the theory of definition, and one towards probabilistic reasoning (to
a certain extent, they came to be treated in a systematic way, too, namely in comments
found in {\ib Port Royal Logic}). What will be most taken into account in
the present discussion is Pascal's analysis of two kinds of intelligence
which contributes much to mind-philosophical logic (in the sense explained
in the next chapter).

All of them were busy with the then fashionable trend to create a
\sb{logic of discovery} --- \id{logica inventionis}, and all dealt with
the problem of how to relate logic to the mechanistic worldview. While
Descartes and Leibniz tried to elaborate a system answering these
questions, Pascal focussed on describing the innate power of human
intelligence without even trying to state a system of rules to guide this
faculty; but it is the description of the mind given by him from which we can
profit most when striving for a logical theory of intelligence.

Let us first compare Descartes and Leibniz. When faced with the above-stated 
questions, they came to different conclusions.
%-----------------------------
\msn
{\bf 2.2.}
Ren\'e Descartes' solution fitted into his radical
\sb{mind-body dualism} concerning the relation between mind and matter.
There are --- he claimed --- two independent substances, each of them
existing in world of its own, even if they interact in a way with each
other, namely \sb{body}, existing in space (\id{res extensa}), and
\sb{mind}, living, so to say, in another dimension
(\id{res cogitans}).
Faced with such a split in reality, one must have asked where logic
belonged. Descartes did not bother with Aristotelian logic which he
regarded as useless for solving real problems.  He created, instead, his
own logic which he called \sb{rules to guide the mind} ({\it regulae ad
directionem ingenii} --- to quote the title of one of his essays); he did
not use the term `logic' as such which would have called to mind the scholastic
tradition.  Later, however, when his ideas started to compete with
traditional ones, his followers did not avoid the term, hence the
denomination \sb{Cartesian logic}.

The phrase itself `rules to guide the mind' hints at the Cartesian solution.
Logic belongs to the realm of mind. Its rules prescribe how the mind
should behave in order to tell what is true from what is false; for
instance, that one should never bother about what other people have said
regarding the matter in question, one should instead concentrate on what can be
grasped by a clear and manifest intuition (rule iii). If one imagines
logical rules as being as close as possible to an algorithm for problem
solving, one has to feel disappointed with such advice. However, Descartes
believed himself (not without some justification) to be  addressing his
rules to intelligent minds, 
not to machines; in the case he could expect an understanding of his
ideas, even if not fully expressed in their literal formulation.

He hoped that {\it the} method defined by such rules, which were extracted
from his own, much successful, experiences in mathematical thinking,
would help people in training and improving their minds.  Thus he
believed he had replaced the old and useless logic by a theory of scientific
methods that would match the challenges of the new age. He also believed
himself to
have taught how to build a mechanistic theory of the material world with a
method due to a deeper insight into the non-mechanical nature of the mind.
%-----------------------------
\msn
{\bf 2.3.} Leibniz's reaction to the crisis of logic is found at the
opposite pole. He was a monist who did not deny reality either of
mind or of matter, but saw the mental as organizing the material at its very
heart. The mind is no `ghost in the machine' (according to Ryle's [1949]    %%
famous saying) but rather an engineer's idea that is to organize the machine's
functioning. In this context logical rules appear well suited to control
behaviour of a \sb{reasoning machine} as arithmetical rules control
the behaviour of a computing machine.

Leibniz not only stated the programme of building a reasoning machine but
also made some theoretical arrangements which we now see as necessary
preparatory steps. Namely, he strenuously attempted to create a logical
calculus which could be performed by a machine ({\it veritas machinae ope
impressa}). Eventually, he succeeded in something that roughly resembled
the later Boolean algebra in which he managed, inter alia, to express the
four types of Aristotelian categorical propositions.%
\note{\n
Unfortunately, his discovery remained unknown up to the end of the 19th
century, and was made independently by more authors from among whom George
Boole has proved most successful. More on this subject is found in
Chapter Three.}
Now we know that the \sb{algebraization of logic} provides us with an
algorithm to mechanically check the validity of any formula of the propositional
calculus, while for the rest of logic (predicate calculus) there are
ingenuous methods to reduce it in a way to   propositional logic.    %%

In this way Leibniz tried to put logic into the mechanistic framework. As for
the demands of the mechanistic approach, his solution appears to be much
more successful than that of Descartes. But what about the other part of
the programme of reforming logic, that called {\it logica inventionis},
which intended to make logic of use in making discoveries, in looking for
new truths?

Leibniz believed that a logical machine could be fit enough to
perform such a demanding task. Were he right, then the {\it logica
inventionis} project would remain in beautiful accord with the mechanistic
framework. However, his point is not likely to be interpreted in a brief
and lucid manner. Only to mention a possible course of interpretation, let
it be recalled that Leibniz put the demarcation line between mind and
matter in a peculiar, so to say, `set-theoretical' manner.%
\note{\n
As to the role of set-theoretical insights in Leibniz's thought, see
the inspiring paper by Friedman [1975].}
Namely, true to his juvenile insights expressed in the dissertation
{\it De arte combinatoria}, he measured the distance between live
creatures and inanimate matter by degree of complexity, namely
infinite in the former case, finite in the latter. Then one might say that
a machine can approximate the mind's performance in a degree proportional to
its being complicated, the limit of such a progression laying in infinity.
The infinite complexity   of life and mind would be actual while that of a
machine only potential, and thus one would save both the idea of 
the insuperability of the mind and the idea of the increasing possibility of its being
replaced by a machine (both nicely combined with Leibniz's infinitistic
framework, and sounding reasonable to present users of ELSI computers,
i.e., those of Extra Large-Scale Integration).
%----------------------------
\msn
{\bf 2.4.} Pascal's contribution to logical and psychological foundations
of rhetoric mainly consists in his famous distinction between
\id{esprit de g\'eometrie} and \id{esprit de finesse}. Their comparison
from the logical point of view can be made in terms of premises and
inferences, as did Pascal when comparing these mental faculties.

Here are Pascal's own words on the {\it esprit de finesse} as
characteristic of practical men being opposed to mathematicians.%
\note{\n
{\bin The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal} transl.  C.~Kegan Paul, London 1895,
George Bell \& Sons, see section `Various Thoughts', p.~310. The phrase
itself does not appear in the quoted text; it appears earlier in a passage
which is continued by the one here cited.}
\s
{\ls The reason that mathematicians are not practical is that they do not
see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the precise and distinct
statements of mathematics and not reasoning till they have well examined
and arranged their premises, they are lost in practical life wherein the
premises do not admit of such arrangement, being scarcely seen, indeed
they are felt rather than seen, and there is great difficulty in causing
them to be felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them. They are
so nice and so numerous, that a very delicate and very clear sense is
needed to apprehend them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are
apprehended, without a rule being able to demonstrate them in an orderly
way as in mathematics; because the premises are not before us in the same
way, and because it would be an infinite matter to undertake. We must see
them at once, at one glance, and not by a process of reasoning, at least
up to a certain degree.
\ssn}
\kor
In another passage (p.~311), Pascal uses the phrase
\sb{penetrative intellect} to name the same faculty. This description is
worth quoting because of its use of the concept of premises which
belongs to the terminology of logic.
\s
{\ls Some are able to draw conclusions well from a few premises, and this
shows a penetrative intellect. Others draw conclusions well where there
are many premises. For instance, the first easily understand the laws of
hydrostatics, where premises are few, but the conclusions so nice, that
only greatest penetration can reach them. And those persons would perhaps
not necessarily be great mathematicians, because mathematics embrace a
great number of premises, and perhaps a mind may be so formed that it
searches with ease a few premises to the bottom, yet cannot at all
comprehend those matters in which there are many premises.  \par
These are two kinds of mind, the one able to penetrate vigorously and
deeply into the conclusions of certain premises, and these are minds true
and just. The other able to comprehend a great number of premises without
confusion, and these are the minds for mathematics. The one kind has force
and exactness, the other capacity. Now the one quality can exist without
the other, a mind may be vigorous and narrow, or it may have great range
and no strength.
\ssn}
\kor
After more than three centuries, these observations display new vitality
--- owing to our familiarity with computers, and to our knowledge, even if
modest, of the functioning of the brain. Certainly it is natural for a
computer to imitate mathematical minds due to the enormous memory
capacities being ``able to comprehend a great number of premises without
confusion''. It is why computers are good at deducing data from explicitly
enumerated, even if gigantic, sets of premises.  As for the brain mechanism
underlaying the penetrative mind, it may be considered as approaching this
model.
An advantage of the brain over the computer consists in an astronomical
number of connections between neural cells so that innumerable data from
many centres and levels can be combined and synthetized at an
appropriately high level in order to yield a conclusion.  The conclusion
follows, so to say, from  premises written nowhere, for no unit in itself
records a whole premise, it may result from a combination and interplay of
unimaginably numerous partial data converging towards a whole to be integrated
by a central unit.

Such a connectivist model accounts for the feature which Pascal 
perceived as the ability to deal with enormous complexity of details; hence
the name `finesse' to suggest that minuteness, and the adjective
`penetrative' to suggest the necessity of penetrating deep layers of a
vast network (to be called a conceptual network in Chapter Eight).
Obviously, a great part of that process must occur at the subconscious level,
so that often a penetrative mind  perceives only the result without being
able to account for either the premises or the ways of conceptualizing
and reasoning; this lack of awareness of our own mental processes is the price
to be paid for their enormous efficiency.

In spite of the denied access to that immense fabric of mental-neural
activity, we shall try to find out a factor at the conscious level owing
to which the penetrative esprit, being a prerequisite of rhetorical
acumen, could significantly improve its performances.
The penetrative mind is defined as one suitably endowed with what I
suggest we call `conceptual potential' and `conceptual engineering' as
principal constituents of intelligence. They constitute the main
subject-matter of mind-philosophical logic which is to provide rhetoric
with a solid cognitive foundation.%
\note{\n
Such a cognitive foundation requires an adequate terminology. To find a
suitable English counterpart for the Pascalian {\nit esprit de finesse}
without coining new and unavoidably artificial terms, I suggest the word
`acumen' as a short and natural translation.  In its original Latin
meaning it denotes a top in acute form, and later, by extension,  high
intelligence, acuteness, wit.}


\bye
