I am honored to be among the
lecturers in this series on natural law. Many of the speakers are
among my heroes and friends. One of my heroes, Alasdair MacIntyre,
used one of his favorite terms in his talk: he spoke of "plain
persons" and their grasp of morality and natural law in
contradistinction to the experts and professional philosophers and
their grasp of these matters. A few years ago in Dallas he gave a
talk entitled "Do plain persons need to be moral philosophers?"
When I was asked to give the response to his talk, I was most
honored because I considered Prof. MacIntyre one of the foremost
moral philosophers in the world and it was a thrill to comment on
his work. I felt dreadfully underqualified — I felt like
some high school kid going up against Larry Bird — until I
realized that I need not respond as an expert, as a moral
philosopher of his caliber, but that I could respond as the
quintessential plain person — for that is what I am. After
all, I am Janet Smith, daughter of John and Anne Smith; I grew up
at 5 Hill Street and went to Home Street School — I could go
on but it is all very plain.
The point I am making here is not merely a flip one — designed to ease us into
more serious matters through an attempt at humor. There is a serious point here —
natural law, is the "plain person's" morality — in a sense it is simply
plain old common sense. There are profound and sophisticated ways at explaining natural
law, but the practice of reasoning in accord with natural law principals, according
to the theory itself, is natural to plain persons — that is, natural to all mankind
for natural law holds that many of the most fundamental principles of moral reasoning are obvious,
that is easily known by all. Yet, in spite of the plain commonsensicalness of natural law,
it can seem shocking and provocative in many ways, for like natural law, plain old common
sense does not command a lot of followers these days and can be shocking when juxtaposed
to the values of our times.
My talk is going to be very basic in several respects. It will review some of the basic
principles that other speakers have covered, some in depth, some more in passing. It will
also be very basic in being the one talk that attempts to make an application of natural
law to concrete moral issues; issues in the realm of sexual ethics. My job is not to
justify natural law ethics but to explain it and apply it. As did many of the earlier
speakers I will largely be following the thought of Thomas Aquinas on these matters and of
Aristotle from whom Aquinas learned many of the principles that informed his teaching on
natural law. I shall also incorporate into my arguments the thought of another stellar
natural law theorist, still alive and well: I shall make use of the work of Karol Wojtyla,
now known as Pope John Paul II. I will refer to him as Wojtyla simply because I do not
want to be thought to be invoking his authority as Holy Father; I cite him simply as a
philosopher who has made great advances of our understanding of natural law, particularly
in regard to sexual ethics.
So let me begin with a review of the principles of natural law. As several other
speakers have noted, Aquinas maintains that the first principle of natural law is "do
good, avoid evil". As he notes, that is a self-evident principle and obvious to all;
if we want to be moral we should do good and avoid evil. No controversy here. The question
is, of course, what is good and what is evil and how to we come to know which is which?
Some think we can't know what is good and evil so the best we can do is live by the
conventions of our times. Others think it best to let our passions be our guide to
whatever we want to do. Others think only revealed religion can give us absolutes. These
three positions capture the predominant views of our times.
Aquinas holds none of these positions. He argues that reason should be our guide to
morality. Not only does he hold that the first principle of natural law, "do good,
avoid evil" is self-evident, he argues that there are other self-evident first
principles, such as "harm no man". These he says are imprinted in the minds of
all by God; I believe other precepts such as "provide responsibly for your
offspring", "give to each man his due" and "seek knowledge" would
qualify as precepts that Aquinas thinks all men know. Men (and I use the term generically
here and throughout) may act against these precepts out of passion or because ignorance of
some fact operative in a situation, but all would agree that such principles are moral
truths. Aquinas goes on to say that what he calls primary precepts of natural law are naturally
and immediately known by man; he cites the 10 commandments as examples of these types of
precepts. These precepts are justified by the primary principles. From the most general
principle "give to each man his due", from an understanding of what one owes to
one's mother and father, it is clear that one "should honor one's father and
mother."
Now this is not to say that one discovers the moral law by discovering these precepts
in a deductive manner moving from the most general to the more particular. Rather, it
seems that often moral discovery, as the discovery of other general truths, moves from the
particular to the universal. That is, an individual could witness or participate in a
transaction and quite immediately make the moral judgment that the act is good or bad.
That is, for instance, an individual could witness someone honoring or dishonoring his
parents and judge the action to be good or bad; from this action and others of the same
sort one may come to formulate the "law" that one should give each man his due.
But it is because we already naturally know — in an unexpressed and unformulated way
— that one should give each man his due, that we are able to see readily that
honoring one's parents is good. Much in the same way that we, without musical training,
can judge certain tones to be off pitch, we have moral "perceptions" that some
actions are good and some bad, without having any explicit training about such kinds of
actions. I speak of these as moral "perceptions" not because they are equivalent
to sense perceptions, but because of their immediacy and their unformulated quality;
indeed, I believe them to be rational in several important respects, not least because
they are cognitive acts and they are in accord with reality.
Let me speak now about rationality and the Thomistic claim that "one should act
rationally." Indeed, one could formulate the first principle of natural law not only
in the most basic formula "do good, avoid evil"; in Thomistic terms, several
formulas serve to express the same truth: for Aquinas, the following phrases are
synonymous: "act in accord with nature"; "act in accord with reason"
or "act rationally"; "act in accord with virtue"; "act in accord
with the dignity of the human person"; "act in accord with a well formed
conscience"; indeed, "act in a loving way", properly understood, serves as
well.
While it would be of great profit to elaborate how each of these phrases is synonymous
with the other, I want to devote most of my efforts here to explaining how "act in
accord with nature" and "act in accord with reason" are synonymous and
worthy guides to moral behavior.
First we must try to get as clear as we can what it means to say "act in accord
with reason" or "act rationally". In our day, reason often gets a bum rap.
This is a fault not of Aristotle or Aquinas but of Descartes and Kant and their followers.
Since they retreated into the mind and abandoned the senses and emotions and nature as
guides to truth, they made reason seem like something coldly logical, impersonal, abstract
and completely devoid of experiential and emotional content. In their view, mathematics
and geometry are seen as the quintessential rational acts; to be rational is to operate
totally within one's mind and to be completely unemotional. Another view of rationality
that dominates modern times is the view that only that which can be measured
scientifically deserves any recognition as objective truth. No truths other than those
substantiated by scientific proofs — truths that can be quantified largely in the
laboratory — count as truth. No proof other than scientific proofs count as truth;
only science and that which approximates to scientific truth is truly rational. Neither
view is the view of reason and rationality held by the ancients and medievalists —
those who defined the view of natural law I am defending here. The ancients and
medievalists did not think rationality was possible without the senses and the emotions
for both are tools to reading reality; they provide the intellect with the material needed
to make a good judgment. The etymology of the word "rational" is rooted in the
word "ratio" which means "measure or "proportion". One is being
rational when one's thought and action are measured to, are proportionate with, or when
one's thought and action correspond with reality (which itself is measured or
governed by discernable laws; more about this momentarily). The thought that leads to
acting in accord with reality is called rational. Now this thought need not be and perhaps
only rarely will be the kind of abstract, cold, logical reasoning of a Descartes, Kant, or
research scientist. This thought can be intuitive, creative, poetic, inductive, deductive,
indeed, whatever human thought can be. It is all called rational thought not because it
proceeds by syllogism or because it is subject to certain scientific tests; it is called
rational because it corresponds with reality — and this includes all of reality, the
spiritual and the transcendental as well as the logically provable and the scientifically
measurable reality. Such thought cannot proceed without abundant data from our senses and
our emotions. The intellect processes such data and orders it; it determines what values
are important in the data and decides on the appropriate response. If one acts rationally,
one then acts in accord with the ordering done by the intellect. While the intellect
should govern the emotions, it is not a natural law teaching that all rational behavior
will be devoid of emotion. Again, the emotions can provide essential data to the
intellect. Emotions that are well-habituated may lead one quite spontaneously to respond
correctly to situations. One may spontaneously get angry at witnessing some act of
injustice and, if one knows one's emotions to be well-ordered, one could respond quite
immediately and correctly to the situation — and even angrily to the situation.
Indeed, at times it may be an appropriate response to reality to rant and rave. One doing
so, is properly called rational, in spite of our common parlance.
This talk of the mind and of rationality as something that is measured to reality
suggests, as mentioned above, that reality is a thing that can be grasped. Natural law
depends upon such. It rests upon the claim that things have natures and essences that we
can know and correspond our actions to. There are many reasons for making this claim. One
is the fact that things act in a predictable fashion; when we learn the properties of oil
and water, for instance, we can predict certain things about their behavior. The fact that
we build bridges which stand, that we make artificial hearts that work, that we put men on
the moon, also indicates we are able to measure our thoughts to the external world and to
act in accord with it.
Moreover, natural law operates on the premise that nature is good; that is, that the
way things naturally are is good for them to be; it holds that the operations of things
and parts of things contribute to the good of the whole. The wings of different birds are
shaped in certain fashions because of the sort of flying that they must do to survive;
different digestive systems work in different ways because of what is being digested.
Indeed, natural law holds that the natural instincts of natural things are good; they lead
them to do what helps those things function well and helps them survive. Since natural
things have an order there is said to be a ratio or order to them; not one of which
they are conscious but one that is written into their functioning. Natural law holds that
we live in a universe of things that have a ratio to them and that we shall get the
best out of these things if we act in accord with the ratio or nature that is
written into them.
Now, man is a natural thing. He, too, has parts and operations and instincts that
enable him to function well and to survive. Man differs from other creatures in that he
has free will; that is, he can either cooperate with his nature or act against his nature,
whereas other natural things have no such freedom. What enables man to be free is his
reason, his rationality; he is able to weigh and measure different courses of action and
to determine which actions are good or bad. According to natural law, those actions are
good which accord with his nature and with the nature of other things. Since man is by
nature a rational animal, it is good for him to act in accord with his reason. By acting
rationally he is acting in accord with his own nature and with a reality that is also
ordered. When he acts rationally, he acts in accord with his own nature and reality and in
accord with the nature and reality of other things.
Now, let's get concrete. Let's talk about acting in accord with the nature of a few
specific things. Take tomato plants, for instance. Tomato plants have a certain nature. In
order to have good tomato plants one must act towards these plants in accord with their
nature; one must water them, give them sunlight and good soil if one wants to produce good
tomato plants. Such is acting in accord with nature in respect to tomato plants, such is
rational behavior in respect to tomato plants. If one's tomato plants fail to produce
tomatoes, one knows that one is doing something wrong; if one's tomato plants produce good
tomatoes, one knows one is doing something right. Prof. Charlie Rice, whose book Fifty
Questions on Natural Law that I understand several of you are reading, speaks of the
rationality of putting oil and not molasses in the engine of a car. One needs to act in
accord with the nature of things if one wishes them to perform well.
So now let us, moving quickly, move to human nature. If a human being wishes to
function and perform well, what does his nature require of him? Let us begin with his
physical nature. There is a considerable consensus about what makes for physical health
and what is conducive to physical health. Those who don't get sick, who are able to
function well in their daily activities, who are not overweight, we call healthy. We know
how to produce such individuals. We are regularly and rightly advised to eat well,
exercise regularly, and to get plenty of sleep. Those who do so generally flourish
physically — because they are acting in accord with nature, with reason, and with
reality. Psychological health is also understood to some extent; we know we need friends
and rest and interests to sustain our psychological health; that is our nature; that is
reality.
Nor are we in the dark about what makes for moral health or moral goodness. We
recognize the goodness of the various virtues such as self-discipline, reliability,
justice and fairness, kindness, truthfulness, loyalty, etc.; those who exhibit these
qualities we generally recognize to be good — that is morally good — human
beings. Parents who have children who display such qualities are rightly proud of them;
their "tomato plants" turned out well.
So, in regard to sexual behavior, to sexual moral health, so to speak, what qualifies
as acting in accord with nature, with reason? How do we determine what it is?
Now, for Aquinas, these are not difficult questions, though, apparently, they are
extremely difficult questions for modern times. We are terribly confused about what proper
sexual behavior is. College newspapers are filled with news of campuses that are devising
codes of moral sexual behavior — codes that are designed primarily to stop or reduce
the incidence of date rape on campus. These codes suggest, mandate, require — I am
not certain what is the correct word — that in sexual activity neither individual
proceed to the next level of sexual activity without obtaining the permission of the other
individual. These codes reflect what has been the principle governing sexual behavior in
modern times for sometime — whatever one feels comfortable with and whatever one
agrees to is morally o.k. This is basically what we are teaching to our young people and
they are doing much what one would expect given that teaching. As long as it feels good,
and they have consented to it, there is no reason for them not to do "it".
Is this working; is this principle leading to moral health or moral sickness? What can
we say about the moral sexual health of our society? What does the fact that 68% of
African-American babies are born out of wedlock suggest? The figure is now 22% in the
white community and rapidly growing. This figure, of course, would be higher if it were
not for the one and a half million abortions a year. One of two marriages is going to end
in divorce. AIDS is decimating some portions of our population. Are there any hints here
that we are violating nature, acting irrationally, failing to live in accord with reality?
Are our tomato plants thriving?
Let's think about each one of these as a concrete moral fact: when we see the
heartbreak and social dysfunction associated with out-of-wedlock births, don't our
immediate and natural moral perceptions and judgments says "something is wrong
here"; when we learn that a woman has had an abortion, no matter what our view of the
morality of abortion, don't we say "something has gone wrong here?"; when we
hear of a divorce and all the surrounding heartbreak and dysfunctionality, don't we think,
"something has gone wrong here?" When we see young people dying of AIDS, don't
we think, "something has gone wrong here?"
Now what I am going to say soon, the moral principle I am soon going to articulate, may
seem perfectly obvious to some and to others seem quite ridiculous. Before I articulate
the principle, I would like to comment briefly on the significance of the diversity of
predicted response to it. MacIntyre spoke about how curious it is in the modern age that
we have so little consensus on the most straightforward claims of natural law; what seems
obvious to some, seems ridiculous to others. Whereas some take this lack of consensus to
suggest that natural law is not universal, MacIntyre took this lack of consensus to
indicate the moral corruption of our times. That is, we have become so corrupt, we cannot
discern what is obvious. I am not going to try to analyze how this came about, but I do
want to make a suggestive analogy with the physical senses. Just like our ears when
subjected to noises that are too loud and sharp, lose some of their ability to hear, so
too does our moral "sense" when subjected to too much corruption lose its
ability to judge what is right and wrong. Much of what I am going to say will sound
strange to modern ears because we have lost our moral sense to some considerable extent.
What is this obvious principle I am threatening to articulate? It is a principle
readily justified by natural law reasoning. A natural law theorist reasons that man
certainly has a natural inclination to engage in sexual intercourse and that that natural
inclination is good for man — much in the same way that sunshine is good for a tomato
plant. As for all animals, sexual intercourse leads to the perpetuation of the species and
that is good. Because man is rational, he can naturally and readily see that his natural
sexual inclinations differ from those of animals who copulate and reproduce willy-nilly.
Human sexual intercourse is clearly for much more than simple reproduction of the species.
Sexual intercourse conduces to the well-being of human beings in many ways. For instance,
sexual intercourse can expand the opportunities for humans to love — not only to love
their sexual partner but also to love the offspring they may have. It allows spouses to
build a family together and to have a meaningful life.
It would be profitable for us to consider a little more how human sexual behavior does
and should differ from animal sexual behavior. Certainly, for both animals and men, sexual
intercourse is extremely pleasurable. But for humans that pleasure is not an uncomplicated
pleasure. First, we have a powerful sense of the power and mystery of sexual intercourse.
We sense that we are dealing with something fraught with emotional risks, fraught indeed
with serious responsibilities. These responsibilities are two-fold, at least; they are the
responsibilities that come with the babies that naturally result from sexual intercourse
and with the bonding between the partners that naturally comes with sexual intercourse. So
here is the key for natural law ethics. Since sexual intercourse has this two-fold natural
purpose that must be respected — the purpose of bringing forth new lives and the
purpose of uniting men and women together, whoever participates in sexual activity must do
so in a way so as to protect these natural goods of sexual intercourse.
Let us speak of babies first. Again, as with animals, the extremely pleasurable act of
sexual intercourse naturally, thought not always or even usually, can lead to the birth of
an offspring. Unlike most animal offspring, a human baby needs years of prolonged and
devoted care to come to maturity. The evidence is overwhelming that such care is best
given by the parents of the baby. And here is where the first major moral principle of
sexual behavior becomes manifest. Given the nature of human babies, given this reality,
isn't it right to posit the moral principle; rational behavior requires that those who
are not prepared to be parents ought not to engage in sexual intercourse? Now that
principle sounds shocking and strange to modern ears, whereas I want to claim that it is
plain common sense; indeed, that it is obvious.
Let me elaborate more upon it. Most individuals want to be good parents. They see that
being a good parent is part of being a good human being and living a full and good human
life. They recognize that children need parents with at least some degree of maturity.
They agree that those who are not ready for babies ought not to have them. They even
agree, for the most part, that being ready to be parents, means being married, for only
those who are willing to commit to marry have the kind of commitment needed for those who
are going to be parents. (Even those men who are sexually promiscuous are generally
uncomfortable with the idea that they may have fathered children who they never know or
care for or that some of the babies they have fathered may have been aborted.) In spite of
this consensus and plain common sense, in our times, these insights do not translate into
seeing that one ought not to have sexual intercourse until one is ready for babies. We
think it is perfectly all right for those who aren't prepared to have babies, to have
sexual intercourse. We think so because we rely upon contraception to sever the natural
connection between having sexual intercourse and having babies. And we think we are being
responsible if we contracept; that is, after all, what responsible sex is, isn't it?
You may have thought that my first principle of sexual morality, "don't have
sexual intercourse, until you are ready to be parents" (or more precisely;
"don't have sexual intercourse until you marry — for only the married are truly
ready to be parents") is the shocking and provocative part of my plain,
commonsensical talk. Well, I intend to shock you further. I am going to say, that in spite
of our modern practices and views about sexual responsibility, contraception is not a
rational or natural act. In fact, I think that contraception is one of the great evils of
modern times for it has been the fuel that has allowed the sexual revolution to rage. And
the sexual revolution has led to the sexual chaos of our culture that I sketched earlier
— millions of babies born out of wedlock, millions of divorces, tens of thousands
dying from AIDS. And this chaos, as we know, leads to multiple other social ills.
Again, I claim that contraception is at the center of this reality and a major
contributor to it because it severs having sex from having babies and allows millions to
participate in an act whose consequences they are not prepared to face. Millions are
involved in relationships that are not prepared for the eventuality of a baby; when a baby
is conceived, abortion or out-of-wedlock birth are the most common results. In my reading,
contraception does not foster responsibility; it fosters irresponsibility by promoting the
view that one needn't be prepared to be a parent in order to have sexual intercourse
responsibly.
The consequences of a contraceptive culture are abundantly clear to us. I think that
once one ponders how unnatural contraception is, how out of accord with reality it is, the
sexual chaos that characterizes our culture should not surprise us. Why would I say that
contraception is not respecting the nature and reality of sexual intercourse? First, I
simply ask you to consider the reality of contraceptives, what they do to a woman's body.
The "pill" is the most popular form of contraception. Furthermore, when does one
generally take a "pill"? Obviously, when one is ill. But is fertility a
sickness? Isn't fertility, a healthy, natural condition? Doesn't "The Pill"
treat fertility as though it were an illness, a defect, not a natural good? And think of
the side effects of The Pill. The insert that comes with The Pill lists a large number of
counterindications or bad side effects. It can cause blood clots and strokes and
infertility; in a small percentage of cases to be sure, but when millions of women are
using The Pill, the small percentages can add up to large numbers. Think of the everyday,
common side effects. It is common for women who use The Pill to complain of increased
irritability, depression, weight gain, and a decreased libido. Isn't The Pill something
every woman wants — something to help her be more irritable, to be more depressed, to
gain weight, and to have a decreased desire to have sexual intercourse! Why would any man
want the woman he cares for and maybe even loves to take such a chemical monstrosity? In
our age when we have come to discover how foolish it is to dump alien chemicals into the
environment, why do we think it sensible for women to put so many alien chemicals into
their bodies?
The most serious feature of The Pill, however, is that it can operate as an
abortifacient. The Pill (and Norplant and Depo Provera) works in three ways. It works by
stopping ovulation; if a woman doesn't release an egg, she cannot get pregnant. It works
by changing the viscosity of the mucus that either helps or hinders the sperm from getting
to the egg. And it works by rending the uterine wall hostile to the fertilized ovum —
or, in my thinking, to the new human being. A woman never knows how the hormones in the
pill are affecting her body; she does not know how it is preventing her from becoming
pregnant. It could be preventing her from ovulating but it also could be causing her to
self-abort. The IUD which has been taken off the market because it endangered the very
lives of women, also operates as an abortifacient. It may stop ovulation, but more often
makes the uterine wall hostile to the fertilized ovum, the new human being. Thus, the same
natural law arguments used to demonstrate the immorality of abortion can be used to
demonstrate the immorality of The Pill, Norplant, Depo Provera, and the IUD. Any man or
woman opposed to abortion should have nothing to do with these contraceptives.
The barrier methods of contraception begin to disclose another feature of contraception
that is against the goods of sexual intercourse. They reveal that contraceptives not only
work against babies, a natural and good outcome of sexual intercourse; they also work
against the uniting and bonding of the sexual partners. The very name "barrier"
is revealing. A couple wishes to make love, but first they must get their
"barriers" in place. They may decide to use a good spermicide to kill whatever
sperm may approach the egg. This action is saying "I want to love you and give myself
to you and to receive you, but I want to kill any sperm that may penetrate my being"
Is there not a discordant note of hostility now in act that is meant to be a loving act.
Does not the rejection of one's beloved's fertility also mean a rejection of one's
beloved, as well, at least to some extent? All of contraception says, "I want to give
myself to you and to receive you but I reject completely your fertility; it is not welcome
here."
Here is where Karol Wojtyla's analysis of sexual ethics has made a major contribution.
Wojtyla has written extensively on human sexuality; it is possible here to give only the
briefest of sketches of his thought. He observes that male and female are made for each
other. Each sex is really incomplete without the other; physically and psychically the
sexes complete each other. The story told by Aristophanes in Plato's Symposium
comically portrays this reality. Aristophanes suggested that the first human beings at one
time had two heads, four legs and arms, etc. They were then cut in half — one half
male, another female and they spend an enormous amount of energy trying to reunite.
Wojtyla maintains that we have a deep and natural need to give ourselves to another
person; to make ourselves whole by giving ourselves to another. He says that this giving
is most completely performed in the sexual act between male and female, an act that is
meant to express the deep commitment and desire for union that we feel and wish to
express. Wojtyla says that the attempt to thwart the fertility of the sexual act means
that one is withholding one's fertility from the other — one is withholding something
that belongs in the sexual act. To withhold it diminishes the meaning of the sexual act.
One way of seeing Wojtyla's point is to think of the difference between the phrases
"I want to have sex with you" and "I am open to having babies with
you." The first phrase is one our culture utters with the greatest of casualness;
contracepted sex is often engaged in with the same commitment that going out to dinner or
playing tennis with another suggests — that is, not much. Being open to having a baby
with another, however, bespeaks a very great commitment to another, the kind of commitment
that should be made by those engaging in an act that might in fact result in a baby! It
bespeaks the willingness to have one's whole life entwined with another, to have breakfast
together, to go to little league games, to plan weddings.
Many in our culture can not imagine life without contraception. They think the
alternative means no sexual intercourse at all or lots of babies. Since our culture is so
obsessed with sex and so hostile to babies, both possibilities seem unthinkable. Few have
any idea how satisfying it is to wait until marriage to have sexual intercourse with
someone one has vowed to spend one's life with. Few have any idea how deeply meaningful
noncontracepted sexual intercourse is; how doable periodic abstinence is in marriage for
those who have abstained before marriage. They know nothing about how methods of natural
family planning work; they often refuse to believe, in spite of the most solid scientific
evidence, that methods of natural family planning are more reliable and effective than any
other form of birth control.
Many fail to see any moral difference between contraception and methods of natural
family planning. They think that since a contracepting couple and one using natural family
planning both intend not to have a child and intend to have sexual intercourse that
doesn't issue in a child, what they are doing amounts to the same thing. The standard
distinction between means and end is certainly operative here; though they may have the
same moral end limiting their family size, one couple chooses the means of thwarting their
fertility, of engaging in potentially fertile acts and simultaneously working to destroy
that fertility, the other couple respects their fertility and when not prepared to accept
a child, refrain from fertile acts. A standard example demonstrating the difference
between contraception and natural family planning, is the analogy with eating. Some who
wish to avoid a weight gain, eat and then force themselves to vomit; they wish to have the
pleasure of eating but not to accept the consequences. Others who wish to avoid a weight
gain do not eat foods that have the consequences of effecting a weight gain. They abstain
from rich foods and only eat them when prepared for the consequences. The parallels with
contraceptive sex and natural family planning are clear.
But the differences between the two means of birth control are much greater than the
above too-quick argument portrays. As a simple indication that what contracepting couples
and couples using methods of natural family planning are doing is remarkably different, I
ask: If they are so similar why are contraceptors so reluctant to switch to a method of
natural family planning and why do those who use natural family planning find
contraception so revolting? Both couples recognize that to switch would be to adopt a
whole new view of sexuality, of their relationship with their spouse (or sexual partner,
in the case of contraceptors) and indeed perhaps a whole new lifestyle. Actions that are
morally equivalent rarely are perceived to be so different in so many respects.
The differences between contraceptive sex and sex governed by the principles of natural
family planning are very many; there is not room here to enumerate them all. Let me,
however, note just a few features of NFP that may suggest how it is eminently human and
draws upon fully human resources. There is something radically anti-female in
contraceptives — they suggest it is better to have a male body that can engage in
sexual intercourse and not get pregnant. Many women resent contraceptives for the
unpleasant side-effects and also resent the male who wants them to use contraceptives.
Women who use NFP, on the other hand, are generally very positive about it, because it
does not in any way threaten their health; it reveres their fertility whereas
contraception, as noted above, treats their fertility as a liability. They have confidence
in the love of their husbands who revere their fertility to the extent that they don't
wish to mess with it. They understand abstaining to be another form of love. After all,
many abstained before marriage, precisely out of love for their beloved.
Let me mention with one other tantalizing thought on this issue: contraceptors divorce
at the rate of 50% while evidence shows that couples using natural family planning divorce
at a rate of under 2%. While several factors undoubtedly contribute to this disparity,
that there is such a disparity suggests that the quality of the relationship of the
couples is vastly different. I suggest the quality of the sexual relationships may be a
major factor and I suggest that the much greater meaningfulness of a sexuality that
respects the baby-making power of sexual intercourse may be the key. The notion that
children are an optional offshoot of sexual intercourse and not a natural and good
consequence that should be respected, leads individuals to make bad choices for marriage
partners. Because our culture denies the intricate relationship between sexual
intercourse, babies, and marriage, those who engage in sexual intercourse often have few
thoughts of marriage or babies in their minds. When they do marry, they are often simply
marrying a sexual partner that they have become used to. Sexual attraction and sexual
compatibility become the chief foundation for relationships. Often when I suggest to young
people that the primary question they should ask themselves when they are looking for a
spouse is "Would this individual be a good parent to our children?" they are
astonished by the question and realize that it would radically influence their choice of a
spouse — and they admit that such a consideration has been far from their minds!
Our culture is a mess and it is largely young people and
particularly young women who are suffering the consequences of this mess. We can hardly
blame them for the choices they make since they are the choices that we have deemed
"responsible". Most who contracept have little understanding of what damage
contraception can do to their relationships and to society as a whole. But as any
biologist knows, if one is ingesting poison, even if it is cleverly disguised as a good,
one will still suffer the ill effects of the poison. No matter how reliant our culture is
on contraception, no matter how good we believe it to be, the evidence is becoming clearer
and clearer that contraception is not the good many hoped it would be. If Aquinas is
correct that nature is ordered and ordered to what is good and if flouting the natural law
leads to things not functioning properly, the current situation should be no surprise. The
reality of sexual intercourse is that it is intimately and naturally connected with having
babies and with creating strong bonds between the sexes. Natural law ethics acknowledges
that living in accord with reality and nature limits our choices and our actions, but it
holds that it limits them in a way that promotes our human good.
— Janet Smith is
Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dallas.
Copyright 2000 Janet Smith. All
rights reserved.