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ABSTRACT
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AXIOLOGICAL REALISM: \pn
ON THE TRUTH-VALUE OF VALUE JUDGEMENTS (VJs)
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The paper consists of the following four sections.
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{\k 1. Axiological intelligence as the faculty of recognizing truth-values
of VJs.} The possessing of truth-values by a VJ is due to some cognitive
content of its axiological predicate that consists in mapping an order,
experienced as satisfaction, or disorder experienced as dissatisfaction.
E.g., a predicate expressing physical pain truly maps a biological disorder,
hence renders the corresponding VL true. More involved cases, e.g.
recognozing a logical order, require what is called axiological
intelligence. This point is opposed to emotivism and cultural relativism as
denying truth-values to VLs.

\msn
{\k 2. Some historical data to assist the understanding of cultural
relativism.} After presenting such data, including A.Ayer's emotivism (as in
a way akin to relativism), it is argued that wrongly, because of following
folk psychology, Ayer denies to any mental act the possibility of its being
emotive and cognitive at the same time. Thus, though he is right in seeing
the emotive side of VJs, he is wrong in inferring that this deprives VJs of
cognitive functions.

\msn 
{\k 3. That relativeness of decidability does not imply relativism of
truth.} A case of inconsistency of cultural relativism is diagnozed as due
to considering truth instead of decidability. A scale of decidability is
considered, where algorithmic decidability is found at the top, and those
more remote are cases relativised to what the paper calls classes of
intersubjectivity.

\msn
{\k 4. That without VJs one cannot develop knowledge of human action.} It is
argued that one needs ideal models of rationality (and those are referred to
in some VJs) to explain and predict human actions. At the same time, such
models reveal an order being the subject of VJs (as considered in Section
1).  Often such models are mathematical (as that of the theory of games),
and then some statements (e.g. the theorem of expected value) both enjoy a
truth value as being mathematical, and the feature of being VJs as
referring to an ideal. Thus the point of the paper is demonstrated.




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